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Introduction  
Coverage of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s religious nationalist ties – largely 
focusing on the group known as Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi) – has frequently taken a 
sensationalist tone. “The Religious Cult Secretly Running Japan,” blares a Daily Beast headline 
from 2016.1 “Japan Reverts to Fascism,” warns The National Review.2 “A Racist, Patriarchal 
Dream,” says Jacobin.3 “The Return of Japan's Imperialists,” announces France24. 4 Little 
research has been done in the English language to counter, or even complicate these claims. 
Within Japan, although religious nationalist groups have existed for decades, they have generally 
faced little press coverage. Only in rare instances, for instance, when Prime Minister Mori 
Yoshiro claimed in a speech before the Shintо̄ political group that Japan was a “sacred country 
centered around the Emperor,” have these groups been noticed by the media. However, the 
scandal surrounding the below-market-value sale of public land to a nationalist school run by a 
former member of Nippon Kaigi has led to a “Nippon Kaigi boom,” with the publishing of reams 
of books claiming to reveal the secrets of the “massive right-wing organization behind Abe,” or 
warning of “a return to pre-war times.”5 Nippon Kaigi on the other hand, calls itself a grassroots 
group of moderate conservative patriots with no special influence or religious character6 – and a 
                                                 
1 Adelstein, Jake, and Mari Yamamoto. “The Religious Cult Secretly Running Japan.” The Daily Beast, The Daily 
Beast Company, 10 July 2016, www.thedailybeast.com/the-religious-cult-secretly-running-japan. 
2 Gelernter, Josh. “Japan Reverts to Fascism.” National Review, 18 July 2016, 
www.nationalreview.com/2016/07/japans-new-fascism/. 
3 Torio, Lisa. “Abe's Japan Is a Racist, Patriarchal Dream.” Jacobin, 28 Mar. 2017, 
www.jacobinmag.com/2017/03/abe-nippon-kaigi-japan-far-right. 
4 Giomataris, Ophélie. “The Return of Japan's Imperialists.” France 24, 1 Mar. 2017, 
www.france24.com/en/20170301-japan-nationalists-emporer-nippon-kaigi-japan-conference. 
5 Yamazaki, Masahiro, Nippon Kaigi: Senzen Kaiki e no Jо̄nen. Tokyo, Shueisha Shinsho, 2016 
6 Yamamura, Akiyoshi. Nihon wo Dame ni Suru Riberaru no Shōtai. Business-sha. 2017 and interview by author 7 
July 2017 
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glance at the Japanese anonymous Internet would suggest that the historical revisionism and 
social conservatism trumpeted by the groups are commonly held positions. 
 But, cutting through the spin and looking at hard data, what it is the actual political role 
played by Nippon Kaigi, its front groups, and the religious groups associated with it revealed to 
be? What are their ideological principles and from where do these principles stem? What are 
their policy priorities? To what extent do they influence policy making within the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and within Japanese politics in general? Is the policy agenda they 
represent likely to be enacted, in full or in part, and is this agenda popular among the general 
public? To answer this question, I closely analyzed the policy positions of the Abe LDP and 
Japanese religious nationalists, drew from a wide array of public opinion polling data, and 
traveled to Japan to interview leadership of the LDP, Nippon Kaigi, and the religious groups that 
support them.7,8 
The picture revealed is far more ambiguous than media coverage suggests. Many LDP 
politicians and especially members of the Abe Cabinet indeed hold close ties to conservative 
religious groups and rely on them as a base of support, and the policy platform advanced by the 
Abe LDP clearly reflects these ties. If the policy aims of these groups, many of which are being 
intensively propounded under Abe, are fully implemented, Japan would, abandoning the ideals of 
the post-war period, join the ranks of the so-called illiberal democracies. At the same time, 
membership in the new religions associated with Nippon Kaigi has continually declined in recent 
years, and the Shintо̄ sphere is in an existential crisis of shrinking population and financial 
distress. Public opinion polls repeatedly suggest that most nationalist causes are somewhat 
unpopular –policies implemented in recent years have been forced through over intense public 
                                                 
7 All translations, unless otherwise noted, are by the author. 
8 Thanks to the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership for funding this research. 
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opposition. Even the constitutional revision that is the key goal of right-wing groups in Japan is 
far from a sure thing. Right-wing religious nationalists play a role in the Abe coalition akin to 
certain special interest lobbyists in the United States – providing help to politicians aligned with 
their ideas in the form of policy proposals and intellectual ammunition, but the strength of this 
coalition is shaky to say the least. The LDP, let alone Japanese politics in general, could 
conceivably turn on a dime and leave these groups out in the cold. 
The Ideology of Japan’s Religious Nationalists 
 The groups I discuss in this thesis share similar ideologies and are religious to different 
degrees. Many are officially affiliated with each other. Other groups have no official connection 
but share overlapping membership or leadership. On a practical level, they all support the right 
wing of the LDP. Their intellectual leadership frequently appears in the right-wing media – such 
as the Internet network Japanese Culture Channel Sakura, the Sankei Shinbun, and magazines 
like Seiron, WiLL, and Hamada.  For convenience I will refer to them collectively as “Nippon 
Kaigi” or as “right-wing religious nationalist groups.” 
 The ideology of Nippon Kaigi is often summarized as “reactionary” or “imperialist,” and 
connected to the system of “State Shintо̄” abolished by the Allied powers after World War II.  
These labels are not necessarily wrong, but they are far from precise. To properly understand the 
ideology of right-wing religious nationalists in Japan, it is necessary to understand the historical 
context in which their belief system exists.  
Nippon Kaigi and, more generally, the nationalist clique surrounding Abe’s ideology 
derives from the religious ideology of pre-war Imperial Japan. The leadership of Nippon Kaigi is 
largely drawn from the leadership of Kyо̄ha Shintо̄ (known as Sect Shintо̄) new religions and 
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Shintо̄ shrines.9 These groups have widely differing beliefs, many of which are completely 
apolitical – but they hold in common a belief in the unique spiritual superiority of the Japanese 
people and the religious importance of the Emperor.   This belief holds these groups together in a 
working relationship, drives much of their political activity, has its origin in what is now known 
as State Shintо̄.  
 A detailed description of the history and ideology of State Shintо̄, the nature of which is 
hotly contested, is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief summary is necessary to understand 
the basic principles of the religious nationalists in Japan today. Sophia University professor 
Shimazono Susumu, a leading authority on Japanese religion, defines State Shintо̄ as a 
nationalist ideological system based on belief in the Emperor’s (and by proxy the Japanese 
people’s) descent from the sun goddess Amaterasu Omikami. This heritage, known as bansei-
ikkei, is posited as the source of the unique Japanese kokutai, a nebulous concept often translated 
literally as “national body.” The kokutai was seen as the spiritual and psychological basis of not 
only the Emperor and the Japanese state’s sovereignty, but also the existence of the Japanese 
people as a nation. In order to preserve this kokutai, the rituals of Emperor worship, centered 
around the main Amaterasu shrine at Ise, must be placed at the center of state affairs, and all 
Japanese must participate. The kokutai, as the fundamental basis of the state, must not be 
compromised by any outside force or idea claiming to be superior.10 Other scholars, generally 
members of the postwar Shintо̄ establishment, limit the definition of State Shintо̄ to mean the 
specific involvement of the pre-war Japanese state in Shintо̄ shrines. This definition, however, is 
extremely lacking, as it fails to draw a significant ideological distinction between other forms of 
Ise-focused Emperor worship and that practiced in Shrine Shintо̄, focusing entirely on form 
                                                 
9 See Appendix 1. 
10 Shimazono, Susumu. Kokka Shintо̄ to Nihonjin, Iwanami Shinsho. 2010 57 
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rather than belief.11 This paper uses the former, wider definition. 
State Shintо̄ began with the nationalist program of the hanbatsu oligarchs of Meiji Japan 
(1868-1912), who, using elements of traditional Shintо̄ worship, ideas from the kokugaku school 
of thought, and influences from the West, built the new Japanese state around the idea of saisei-
itchi, the concept that the political functioning of the state should be united with the spiritual 
functions of the emperor system. To this end, the Meiji government revolutionized Shrine Shintо̄, 
forcibly separating shrines from Buddhist influences, placing shrines under the direct control of 
the government, and directing shrine priests to teach a nationalist ideology (in what is known as 
the Great Promulgation Campaign). The authorities also utilized new religions (such as 
Kurozumikyо̄ and Konkо̄kyо̄) that had sprung up during the turbulent late Edo period to spread 
the new ideology, co-opting these faiths, which were originally mostly based on a charismatic 
founder offering faith healing or other types of worldly salvation with a thin veneer of Buddhist 
or Shintо̄ imagery, to fit the needs of the government. 12 
This campaign did not immediately succeed in replacing Buddhism as a sole religious 
creed in Japan, and indeed, from the end of the nineteenth century onward, the predominant 
government position was that Shintо̄ was not a religion at all. Rather, as the core of the kokutai, it 
superseded the category of religion altogether. In this vein, the government placed Shintо̄ in the 
center of the lives of Japanese citizens in ways that, although they might seem religious to 
Westerners, were not explicitly so. The most important of these were the promulgation of the 
Imperial Rescript on Education and the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors, as well as the 
establishment of Yasukuni Shrine at the center of the national consciousness.  The rescripts, 
especially the Rescript on Education, were venerated as holy objects and made “loyalty [to the 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 86-90 
12 Hardacre, Helen. Shintō And the State: 1868-1988. Princeton University Press, 1991. 59 
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Emperor] … into universal values that could not be questioned or subordinated to anything 
else.”13 Yasukuni Shrine, similarly, coopted the old religious practice of venerating dead soldiers, 
regardless of whom or for what they were fighting, and became the national shrine for the 
deification of eirei, heroes who died for the Emperor. Yasukuni would become a central symbol 
of the state, hosting key events and even being inscribed on currency. 
 This ideology, however, should be distinguished from what Walter Skya calls “radical 
Shintо̄ ultranationalism,” the ideology that dominated Japan immediately prior to and during 
World War II. The dominance of this ideology, influenced by thinkers like Minoda Muneki and 
Kakehi Katsuhiko, marked the shift from civilian, elite control of politics to a military dominated 
state – pushed forward by the so-called “government by assassination.” It entered the core of 
Japanese state ideology with the publication by the Education Ministry of Kokutai no Hongi 
(Cardinal Principles of the National Body) in 1937 and Shinmin no Michi (Path of Subjects). 
This ideology was a kind of völkisch fascism that endorsed unbridled expansionism and 
aggression.14 Although mainstream right-wing religious nationalists, the ones in Abe’s camp, 
justify past expansionism and aggression and rely on ethnic chauvinist pride to support their 
ideas on a frequent basis, they have no desire for Japan to resume foreign expansion; and they 
are hesitant to emphasize völkisch, racialist ideas of the state, which threaten the political elite 
they are strongly tied to.  
 Japanese political scientist Kuno Osamu distinguished these ideologies by describing the 
Meiji period nationalism as a dichotomy between a presentation to the public of a carefully 
managed “exoteric” (kenkyо̄) ideology of Emperor worship and nationalism with an elite 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 121-123 
14 Skya, Walter. Japan's Holy War: The Ideology of Radical Shintō Ultranationalism. Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2009.  
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consensus around an “esoteric” (mikkyо̄) ideology of Western-style nation building, science, and 
rule of law. According to Kuno, during the pre-war Showa period, the exoteric faith, having 
developed and expanded beyond the control of elites, overtook the esoteric faith and gained 
control of the country.15 Nippon Kaigi desires a system more like the pre-Showa esoteric/exoteric 
system, rather than a fascist military dictatorship in the model of World War II Japan.  
Post-War Right-Wing Activism and the Rise of Nippon Kaigi 
 However, the aim of these groups is not merely a reactionary return to the political 
system of Meiji Japan. The postwar experience of these religious groups – particularly the 
religious group central to the founding of Nippon Kaigi, Seichо̄-No-Ie, is essential to 
understanding the ideology behind the Abe nationalists. Nippon Kaigi was formed in 1997 from 
the merger of two organizations, Nippon wo Mamoru Kai (the Committee to Protect Japan), 
made up of former Seicho-no-Ie followers and the leadership of Shintо̄ shrines, and Nippon wo 
Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi (Citizens’ Meeting to Protect Japan), mostly made up of conservative 
business leaders and public intellectuals.16 The goal of the group was to serve as a sort of 
clearing house for activism by conservative groups, which had up until that point coordinated 
their activities to a limited extent or not at all.  
 These groups’ political involvement stems from two major struggles– first, efforts by 
right-wing student groups to counter the large campus leftist movement in the 1960s, and second, 
the attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to restore various aspects of the Imperial cult, such as the 
National Foundation Day and the Imperial Era naming system for years. This second cause 
reflects a reactionary desire to restore the prewar system. However, the expressly anti-communist 
                                                 
15 Skya 133. 
16 Sonoda, Koji. Nippon Kaigi and Grassroots Mobilization of Japan's Right Wing. UJSP Occasional Papers, Har-
vard University. 2015  
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and anti-leftist tendency serves as a reaction to a postwar environment in which the Japanese left, 
now permitted to openly express its views and participate in elections, had gained considerable 
support. Millions had protested the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, and in the early 1970s, the 
Communist Party newspaper Akahata had over 6.5 million subscribers.  A revolution bringing 
Japan into the Soviet Bloc was considered to be a real threat by the right wing. Nationalist 
religious groups found this threat to be especially terrifying, as the Japanese Communist Party 
and activist groups to its left, such as the Zengakuren and the Chukakuha, desired the abolition of 
the Emperor system. 17 In response to this, Taniguchi Masaharu, the founder of Seichо̄-no-Ie, 
who had been influential intellectually during the wartime years, created the Nippon Seinen 
Kyogika (Japan Young Mans’ Conference, Nisseikyo for short) in 1970 out of student members 
who had succeeded during the previous years in expelling left wing protestors from Nagasaki 
University.18  In 1972, Taniguchi founded Nippon wo Mamoru Kai with the cooperation of 
several other new religions.  
Although not directly connected to Nippon Kaigi, the Unification Church of Reverend 
Sun-Myung Moon, which had found fertile ground in Japan for converts, also began intense anti-
Communist activities during this period, and continues to ally with the LDP on conservative 
causes to this day. 19 Although Seicho-no-ie itself would distance itself from politics after the 
death of Taniguchi Masaharu, fundamentalists continued to carry Taniguchi’s torch. Nisseikyo 
still exists and shares an office with Nippon Kaigi, and many of the most important figures on 
the hardline nationalist right in Abe’s circle became active during this period.20 The hardline 
                                                 
17 Yamazaki.  
18 Tawara, Yoshifumi. Nippon Kaigi No Zenbo: Shirarezaru Kyodai Soshiki No Jittai. Kadensha, 2016. 17 
19Suzuki, Eito. "Tо̄itsu Kyо̄kai = Shо̄kyо̄ Rengо̄ -- Sono Uha Undо̄ no Rekishi to Genzai" Nihon no Ukeika Tettei 
Chо̄sa. Ed.Tsukada Hotaka. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobо̄, 2017. 342-351. Print 
20 Nippon Kaigi head Kabashima Yuzo; Abe’s closest parliamentary ally Eto Seichi; Meisei University Professor 
Takahashi Shiro; and Ito Tetsuo, head of the Japan Policy Institute, often called Abe’s “brain.” (Sonoda 29) 
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nationalist segment of Seicho-no-Ie no longer belongs to the group but continues to espouse 
Taniguchi Masaharu’s nationalist philosophy. To this day, Nippon Kaigi members rail about the 
imminent threat of communism and the “Comintern” (despite the dissolution of the Comintern in 
1943) to Japan.21,22,23 
 The fear of a leftist takeover cannot be understated and leads one to the deeper 
conspiratorial thinking of the groups in question. This conspiratorial strain cannot be 
underestimated. Members of Nippon Kaigi and associated religious groups, as well as officials in 
the LDP itself, emphasized this point frequently, one LDP official even pressing on me a book 
called The Errors of Communism, and these notions are a constant presence in the Japanese 
conservative media sphere. Japan is seen as constantly under attack by threats external and 
internal – and the threats do not merely pose a risk to Japan’s security interests, but also the 
unique “spirit” (seishin) of the Japanese people. For instance, one conspiracy theory centers 
around the so-called “War Guilt Information Program,” the idea, first propounded by literary 
critic Eto Jun, that the existence of pacifism and liberalism in Japan is the result of 
“brainwashing” by Allied censorship, and that the people of Japan are still psychologically 
enslaved by the United States.24 A search on Sankei Shimbun’s (a newspaper that is a center of 
conservative opinion and a key ally of Abe’s) website for the term “WGIP” returns 63 hits since 
the year 2016.  
Nippon Kaigi’s Policy Goals 
                                                 
21 Sugita, Mio. "’Hoikuen Ochita Nihon Shine’ Ronsо̄ wa Zentei ga Machigatteimasu. Nihon wo Otoshimetai 
Seiryoku no Shin no Nerai to wa..." Sankei News., 4 July. 2016. Web. 27 Mar. 2018. 
22 Mizushima, Satoru, dir. Sayoku No Honshitsu: Kyosanshugi Wa Shinda Ka. Nippon Bunka Channel Sakura. 
Tokyo, 24 Feb. 2018. Web. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpR4wJivgPw>. 
23  "Sekai No Shihaiso Wa Mina 'Comintern'!?" CGS Kawasoe Keiko/Sugita Mio: Joshi No Intelligence. 3 Dec. 
2016. Channel Grand Strategy. Web. 29 Mar. 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5w1ibuDQ8Y>. 
24 Nogawa, Motokazu. "Rekishisen no Kessen Heiki, ‘WGIP-ron’ no Genzai ." Nihon no Ukeika Tettei Chо̄sa. 
Ed.Tsukada Hotaka. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobо̄, 2017. 256-275. Print. 
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 Having outlined the ideological background of Nippon Kaigi, let us now summarize the 
policy aims of Japanese religious nationalists. On Nippon Kaigi’s homepage, the organization 
defines its goals as follows: 
1.) Moving the Japan of tomorrow towards its beautiful traditional character. 
2.) Anew Constitution suitable for a new era. 
3.) A politics that protects the honor of the state and the lives of citizens. 
4.) Building an education that nourishes “Japanese feeling” 
5.) Increasing the nation’s safety and contributing to the world’s peace. 
6.) In the spirit of co-prosperity, friendship with the world. 
 
In the description of these goals on the website, it is apparent that these goals are synonymous 
with: 
1.) Placing Shintо̄ rituals, especially Emperor worship and Yasukuni Shrine, in a 
privileged position, as well as implementing socially conservative policies, such as 
opposition to feminism and gay rights.  
2.) Constitutional revision 
3.) Historical revisionism 
4.) Removing liberal elements of the educational system (human rights, pacifism, and 
feminism) 
5.) Strengthening the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and hawkish foreign policy 25 
 
All of these goals are currently important in Japanese religious nationalist activism, but we will 
focus on the issues of constitutional revision, historical revisionism, and education reform, as 
these are the issues on which the Abe Administration is working most actively. 
 The first and most obvious goal of religious nationalists is to amend the constitution. 
Revision of the Japanese Constitution has, at least in theory, been a key goal of the Japanese 
right wing since the ratification of the current constitution during the Occupation in 1947. The 
nature of the drafting of the constitution and its liberal, Western bent, led to its being labeled by 
the right as an invalid, forcibly imposed Constitution which ought to be replaced by an 
“independent constitution,” or merely declared invalid and replaced by the old Meiji constitution 
from before the war. The importance that Japanese conservatives place on constitutional reform 
                                                 
25 “Nippon Kaigi ga Mezazu Mono” http://www.nipponkaigi.org/about/mokuteki, retrieved 2 April 2018 
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however, stems not from an adherence to principles of constitutionalism and rule-of-law, but 
from a notion that a constitution is a symbol of the nation and important to the kokutai, a 
throwback to constitutional theories during the Meiji period. Revising the Constitution is 
frequently framed as part of kunizukuri, a word which literally means “nation building” but has 
its roots in the Shintо̄ myth of Japan’s origin, in which the god Okuninushi builds the land of 
Japan and cedes it (kuniyuzuri) to the descendants of the sun goddess Amaterasu – the Japanese 
Imperial line. Nippon Kaigi policy chief and Japan Policy Research Center head Ito Tetsuo is 
unable to help revealing his views on the basic principles of popular sovereignty, and human 
rights in a pamphlet ostensibly meant to sell right-wing constitutional reform to the public: 
“Certainly, from the standpoint of tatemae [public stance as opposed to private thought], 
we do not deny the principle of popular sovereignty. However, we do not believe there is 
no room for debate on these principles. For instance, questions like what sovereignty is in 
the first place, whether the ‘people’ in the concept of popular sovereignty are the 
currently existing people, and whether the Emperor is one of the ‘people’… on the matter 
of human rights… we must ask whether human rights are really unlimited and how the 
state should limit them.”26 
 
To examine the practical goals of Nippon Kaigi in constitutional revision, it will help to look at 
an example. The LDP outlined its ostensible plans for constitutional revision during its time in 
opposition in a 2012 draft constitution. The draft was a complete overhaul of the 1947 
constitution. Notable changes in the draft include the establishment of a Japanese National 
Defense Army, the granting of emergency powers to the prime minister, the placement of the 
Emperor as head of state, and the comprehensive limiting of rights to those rights that “are not 
inconsistent with public interest and order,” while legislating obligations to go with the rights 
that already exist. This draft lines up neatly with the priorities espoused by Nippon Kaigi and the 
Shintо̄ Seiji Renmei (the Association of Shintо̄ Shrines’ political wing). The preamble seems 
                                                 
26 Tetsuo et. al, Kore ga Wareraga Kenpo Kaisei Teian da, 2017. p.190 
Weiss 12 
ripped directly from the Nippon Kaigi homepage, extolling Japan as a country that “receives an 
Emperor [from the gods]” and has “pride in country and hometown,” and establishes the 
Constitution as a means of protecting the “good traditions” of Japan.27  This restriction of rights 
in favor of tradition reflects the concerns held by Nippon Kaigi about “excessive rights-
consciousness.” However, in the last year, the focus of efforts to revise the constitution has 
shifted specifically to the pacifist Article 9. Believing the idea of removing the pacifist elements 
of the Article to be a non-starter, Abe has proposed leaving them alone, while adding an 
additional clause to clarify the legality of the Self-Defense Forces.  
 The second goal of religious nationalists is to change Japan’s educational system from the 
postwar, liberal-leaning system into a patriotic education system. Nationalists blame a myriad of 
Japan’s problem on the educational system and the Japan Teachers Union (Nikkyōso). A report 
based on a trip taken in 2005 by six Nippon Kaigi-affiliated Diet Members to England with the 
goal of copying Margaret Thatcher’s educational reforms provides a window into the way of 
thinking in question.28 (It has also been suggested that this trip shaped the educational policy 
adopted by the LDP in later years.29) The group identified the problems of the pre-Thatcher 
education as, first, being “student-centered,” leading to a fall in academic performance and the 
creation of an “irresponsible society of people who must rely on others,”30 as well as being 
“masochistic” in referring to the past misdeeds of the British Empire. This education, they said, 
results in students who cannot “have enough pride to rebuild their country.”31  
 The report comes to several conclusions on the desirable steps to be taken in education. It 
                                                 
27 Liberal Democratic Party, “Nihon-koku Kenpo Kaisei Soan,” 2012. 
https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/news/policy/130250_1.pdf  
28 Eikoku Kyoiku Chosadan, and Terumasa Nakanishi. Thatcher Kaikaku Ni Manabu: Kyoiku Seijoka He No Michi. 
PHP Kenkyujo, 2005. 
29 Tawara. 58 
30 Chosadan 24-27 
31 Chosadan 80 
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proposes completely overhauling the textbook approval system to ban “masochistic” textbooks, 
adding patriotism as a required theme in textbooks, enforcing rigid centralized standards for 
schools and grading teachers based on these standards, and reintroducing religion into the 
educational system with the goal of strengthening family structures. 
 The third goal, somewhat related to the second, is historical revisionism. Nippon Kaigi is 
extremely active in this arena. The position of Japanese religious nationalists is that World War II 
(the Greater East Asia War, in their parlance) was a righteous quest of liberation by the Japanese 
against the Western colonial powers. Japan’s attack on China and later on the United States were 
in self-defense, and Japanese soldiers behaved honorably. The Tokyo War Crime Trials of 1946 
were “victor’s history” and claims by Asian countries of cruelty by Japanese soldiers are 
propaganda with no basis in fact. If any of the claims turn out to be  true – well, whatever 
happened was acceptable by the standards of the time. The historical consensus about Japan’s 
actions during World War II is a form of “masochistic history” according to nationalists and is 
responsible for many of the problems in Japanese society.  
Ultimately, the nationalist approach to history is not about a precise accounting of reality. 
It is, in their words, based on “feeling rather than logic.”32 The idea that the noble Japanese army 
and Japanese people committed crimes is untrue because it is ideologically unacceptable.  
Religious nationalists want to replace the generally accepted narrative of the war with their own 
interpretation, not only in the Japanese education system, but in international discourse as well. 
To this end, they want the Japanese government to revoke its apologies for World War II 
atrocities (specifically the 1995 Maruyama Statement and 1993 Kono Statement). In practice, 
Nippon Kaigi actively challenges narratives about the Nanking Massacre and comfort women – 
                                                 
32 Seiron SP Vol. 2:  Tenno to no Kizuna ga Jikkan Dekiru 100 no Shiza. 25 May 2017: 191. Print. 
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targeting China and Korea, while generally refraining from taking action on gaps in historical 
awareness with the United States. 
 As part of its revisionist project, Nippon Kaigi also endorses official visits by the Prime 
Minister to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. As the head of the Shintо̄ Shrine Association and 
the Chief Priest of Yasukuni both sit on the board of Nippon Kaigi, this is unsurprising. Religious 
institutions, in Japan and globally, as a rule, desire state support through tax benefits and the like, 
but Shintо̄ is unique within Japan in attempting to secure direct state financial support for its 
activities, in a return to the pre-war model. The former is not seriously controversial in Japan and 
is thus a weak incentive to support particular politicians, but the latter is stronger. 
 Nippon Kaigi attempts to fulfill these goals through several methods. The group has 
undertaken many ostensibly “grassroots” efforts to push its goals. Nippon Kaigi activists 
frequently tour Japan giving lectures and occasionally giving public speeches from propaganda 
trucks.33 Notably, a Nippon Kaigi affiliate group, the Citizens' Association for Creating a 
Constitution for a Beautiful Japan, conducted a petition drive aimed at amending the Japanese 
Constitution, collecting 10 million signatures after three years of effort. The number of valid 
signatures is unclear, but all reports show that the primary means of collecting signatures was 
through Shintо̄ shrines, who were required by the Association of Shintо̄ Shrines to collect 
signatures. Despite this, Abe’s renewed commitment to develop a concrete proposal for revision 
in the near future appears to have stalled the petition collection.34 
 Nippon Kaigi and its associated organizations and activists also make efforts independent 
of the LDP to advance historical revisionism, publishing a truly astonishing array of books and 
                                                 
33 The religious nationalists discussed in this paper should not, however, be confused with the uyoku dantai right-
wing groups frequently seen in Japan’s public spaces 
34 A visit to multiple shrines in Tokyo during New Year 2018 found no signatures being collected. 
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articles with a revisionist bent, as well as a history textbook which was adopted by the major 
cities of Yokohama and Osaka.35 They also make legal efforts to silence speech both within and 
outside of Japan regarding the Nanjing Massacre and the “comfort women” who were forced into 
prostitution and sexual slavery during the war.  These cases, including a suit against the city of 
Glendale, California for erecting a statue of comfort women36 (the Japanese government even 
filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the revisionists)37 and multiple lawsuits against the Asahi 
Shimbun for coverage of the Nanjing Massacre and comfort women – have had no successes. 
 Despite Nippon Kaigi’s self-assessment of itself as a grassroots group, the primary 
influence of right-wing religious nationalists in Japan is through its personal lobbying 
connections to politicians, and to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in particular. Nippon Kaigi 
primarily lobbies Diet members through parliamentary associations called giin renmei. There are 
dozens of giin renmei, but multiple sources confirmed that Nippon Kaigi’s is one of the most 
active, holding study sessions and discussion groups for parliamentarians. In addition to its own 
umbrella group, the Nippon Kaigi Diet Members’ Roundtable (Nippon Kaigi Giin Kondankai), 
Nippon Kaigi maintains orbiting groups focused on single issues. The Shintо̄ Shrine Association 
also maintains its own active giin renmei aligned with Nippon Kaigi’s. 
Japanese Public Opinion on Nationalist Policies 
The efforts of religious nationalists to influence public policy in Japan face a major 
problem, however: the policy goals pursued by religious nationalist groups are, at least according 
to popular opinion polls, unpopular among the public. In regard to every religious nationalist 
                                                 
35 Not the controversial and barely used Tsukuru-kai textbook, as is commonly believed, rather, a textbook published 
through the Sankei publisher Ikuhosha designed by a group called the Organization for Reviving Japan’s Education 
(Nihon Kyoiku Saisei Kiko). This group is led by Yagi Hidetsugu, a professor at the right-wing Reitaku University 
who is associated with Nippon Kaigi. 
36 Michiko Gingery Et. Al V. City of Glendale. D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01291-PA-AJW. United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit. 4 Aug. 2016. FDSys. U.S. Government Publishing Office, n.d. Web. 4 Apr. 2018. 
37 http://gahtjp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Mera-Amicus-Brief.pdf 
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policy goal, polling shows either ambivalence or opposition. Nippon Kaigi’s socially 
conservative and religious views are intensely opposed, while their nationalistic foreign policy 
goals are either opposed by a majority of the public or split the public down the middle. 
To begin with, Japanese people do not regard themselves as very religious. A 2009 Gallup 
poll found only that 29 percent of Japanese claim that religion is an important part of their 
daily lives.38 The Japanese word for religion shūkyō, is often considered by Japanese 
people not to include beliefs like Shintо̄, however, so this poll definitely understates the 
prevalence of religious belief. NHK polls the Japanese public every five years about 
various issues of “Japanese consciousness,”39 and results showed that in 2013, just 32 
percent of respondents believed in the power of the Buddha, while only 40 percent 
believed in the Shintо̄ kami (overlapping answers were possible). However, spirituality 
and magical thinking were not absent from the public consciousness. Concepts like 
fortune-telling, charms, and miracles were also included in the poll, and only 25 percent 
of respondents answered negatively to belief in any spiritual concepts.  
 All of this is not to suggest that the Japanese public is rigidly anti-nationalist. The NHK 
poll on public consciousness shows the following results for questions about nationalism: 
 1983 1993 2003 2013 
Do you agree with the 
following: 
    
Japanese people, 
when compared with 
other nationalities, 
have an extremely 
superior character. 
71% 57% 51% 68% 
Japan is a first-class 
country 
57% 49% 36% 54% 
                                                 
38 http://news.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx 
39 Daikyukai ‘Nihonjin no ishiki’ chosa (2013), NHK, 
https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/140520.pdf 
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The data show a mild resurgence of nationalistic thought in Japan from lows in the 1990s and 
2000s to levels similar to that of the 1980s. This resurgence has been linked to poor relations 
with Japan’s neighbors China and Korea. In recent years, Japanese government statistics have 
shown public sentiment towards these countries reaching deep lows (see Figure 1). The public is 
not very receptive to complaints by neighbors of past aggression. Although a poll in 2006 
showed most respondents believing that Japan’s invasion of China was an act of aggression, and 
an Asahi poll from 2015 shows 60 percent of respondents supporting the 1995 Murayama 
Statement apologizing for past colonialism and aggression40, a 2015 Yomiuri Shimbun poll shows 
81 percent of respondents believing that Japan has already apologized enough for World War II.41 
Polling in 2018 about Korean disapproval of the 2015 agreement on comfort women found 85 
percent of respondents “not understanding” the Korean position and opposing compromise.42 
This may be taken to suggest that public sentiment in Japan would be receptive to conservative 
policies that emphasize the superiority of the Japanese people and ignore the concerns of East 
Asian neighbors, like historical revisionism and constitutional amendment.  
 However, it is apparent that the public is hesitant when faced with the idea of 
implementing these ideas in ways that would harm foreign relations or place Japanese soldiers at 
risk. Indeed, in the same government polling mentioned above, 77 percent of respondents 
considered improving relations with China “important” in 2017; 40 percent of those calling it 
“quite important,” while 70 percent considered improving relations with South Korea important. 
Practically, this appears in the general hesitance to endorse visits to Yasukuni Shrine, with polls 
                                                 
40 http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/asian-opinion-poll-database/asahi-
shinbun-regular-public-opinion-poll-02172015/ 
41 http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/opinion/koumoku/20150226-OYT8T50104.html 
42 JNN, January 2018 
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in both 2004 and 2014 showing the public divided, with roughly 40 percent on each side of the 
question, 43,44  and most wanting Class A war criminals to be removed from the shrine. 
 Hawkish policies are unpopular among the Japanese public. The Abe administration’s 
change in the interpretation of the Constitution to include “collective self-defense” was done 
amid the opposition of the majority of the population, with a Kyodo News poll showing 84 
percent believing the move was done without significant explanation, and 60 percent opposing it 
outright.45 In 2015, the government passed legislation through the Diet based on this 
interpretation, despite facing massive protests in the capital. Another Kyodo News poll, taken 
before the passing of the legislation showed the same roughly sixty percent of the population 
opposing the legislation.46  The approval rating of the administration also dropped heavily. After 
the legislation was passed, however, the disapproval did appear to wane somewhat, with a TV 
Asahi poll showing 34 percent in favor, 43 percent opposed, with 23 percent unsure.47 In 2017, a 
Yomiuri Shinbun poll (with an admittedly leading poll question) showed 56 percent in favor of 
collective self defense with 41 percent against.48 
 Revision of Article 9, too, is opposed by the public. NHK polling in 2017 found that, 
although 43 percent of respondents wished to revise the Constitution in general, 57 percent 
opposed revising Article 9. Eighty-two percent believed that Article 9 contributed to Japan’s 
safety and peace.49 Views on the addition of the Self-Defense Forces to Article 9 while 
preserving the pacifist elements are more ambiguous, with NHK polling in March 2018 showing 
                                                 
43 http://www.asahi.com/special/shijiritsu/TKY200404190343.html 
44 https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS26023_W4A120C1PE8000/ 
45 Richards, Clint. "Polls Give Abe a Bump, But Not on Collective Self-Defense." The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 05 
Aug. 2014. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/polls-give-abe-a-bump-but-not-on-collective-self-defense/>.  
46 Kyodo News, “Anpo Hosei wa Kenpo Ihan  no Kaito ga 57% ni mo, Kyodo Tsushin Yoron Chosa.”,J-CAST, 22 
June 2015, <https://www.j-cast.com/2015/06/22238323.html> 
47 http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst_archive/poll/201603/index.html 
48 http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/opinion/koumoku/20170501-OYT8T50009.html 
49 NHK, “Yoron Chosa: Nihonjin to Kenpo 2017” https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/kenpou70/yoron2017.html 
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36 percent in favor and 23 percent opposed,50 while TV Asahi polling in January 2018 showed 
52 percent in favor and 34 percent opposed.51 
 On social issues, as well as foreign policy, public opinion does not favor religious 
nationalists. When it comes to feminism and gay rights, Japan has moved in a decidedly liberal 
direction. According to the NHK consciousness poll, the belief that a woman with children 
should be able to continue working has gone from being held by a mere 20 percent of 
respondents in 1973 and 45 percent in 1993 to a full 53 percent in 2013, and the belief that 
married women should not work is held by a mere 10 percent. A February 2018 government poll 
found 40 percent of respondents supportive of allowing women to keep their last names when 
marrying with only 20 percent opposed.52 Nippon Kaigi considers this an important area of their 
activism. A 2015 poll by researchers53 found 51 percent of respondents in favor of gay marriage. 
 Although public opinion is either ambiguous or opposed to most of Nippon Kaigi’s 
policy, the strength of this opposition is debatable. A Mainichi Shimbun poll before the House of 
Councillors election in 2016, during which opposition parties emphasized the danger of 
constitutional revision in their campaign, showed only 22 percent of non-Abe-supporters polled 
considering constitutional revision the most important issue, tied for first with pensions. Among 
Abe supporters, only 8 percent considered constitutional revision particularly important.54 This 
implies that neither Abe’s base of popular support nor his opponents consider the same issues 
important that Nippon Kaigi does. A poll before the 2017 snap elections once again found limited 
interest in both constitutional revision and the JSDF as opposed to economic issues, with 11 
                                                 
50 http://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/shijiritsu/ 
51 http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/201801/index.html 
52 Jiji Press, “Fufu bessei yonin, 4waricho ni zoka: Kibosha wa shosu – naikakufu chosa”, 10 February 2018 
53 Kamano, Saori, et. al. “Seiteki Minority Ni Tsuite No Ishiki -- 2015nen Zenkoku Chosa Houkokusho.” Grants-in-
Aid for Scientific Research -- Building Japan Queer Studies Research Group, June 2016. 
54 https://mainichi.jp/articles/20160530/k00/00m/010/039000c 
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percent of voters saying they were concerned about the Constitution, and 7 percent being 
concerned most about collective self-defense. 55 It is possible that, especially in the context of a 
fractured political opposition, the LDP is not concerned about how unpopular these policies are. 
The only factor that appears to rein in LDP nationalism is foreign opposition. It is foreign 
pressure, especially from the United States, that has forced the adminsitration to begrudgingly 
maintain the Kono and Murayama Statement and enabled the (beleaguered) 2015 agreement on 
the comfort women issue. Given Japan’s complete dependence on American security support, 
this is unsurprising. 
Nationalist Policy Initiatives of the Abe LDP 
 Despite this, the influence that religious nationalists have on LDP policy making is 
indisputable. The Nippon Kaigi Diet Member Roundtable had 281 members as of 2016, 247 of 
whom were LDP members. This makes up roughly 60 percent of LDP Diet members, and 40 
percent of all Diet members. In Prime Minister Abe’s 2017 Cabinet, 75 percent of cabinet 
ministers and 67 percent of all cabinet members (including advisors, vice-ministers, etc. ) 
belonged to Nippon Kaigi, while a whopping nineteen out of twenty, 95 percent of cabinet 
ministers belonged to the Shintо̄ Diet Members’ association, only excepting the Transport 
Minister, who is a member of the Buddhist Komeito Party, a coalition partner of the LDP’s.56 In 
the latest cabinet shuffle as well, despite being portrayed by the media as a concession to the 
moderate wing of the LDP, the same 70 percent of cabinet ministers belonged to Nippon Kaigi.  
 Both the first Abe Administration in 2006-2007 and the second which began in 2012 have 
pursued policy directives coming from Nippon Kaigi. In 2006 (one year after the Nippon Kaigi 
trip to England), the Abe administration, in one of its first acts, pushed through a conservative 
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revision of the Fundamental Law on Education, deleting the idea that education should 
encourage constitutional values of individualism and adding “love for country and homeland,” 
“moral education,” “respect for tradition,” “general religious knowledge,” and a “correct view of 
history” as goals of the education system.57 The drafting of the new law appears to have 
originated in a proposal by the “Association to Demand a New Fundamental Law on Education,” 
whose executive director was Takahashi Shiro, policy committee member of Nippon Kaigi.58   
Regarding historical issues, the Abe administration has followed a relentlessly revisionist 
line. Abe inaugurated his brief first administration by causing a fracas over the so-called 
‘comfort women’ utilized by Japan’s army during World War II, claiming that there was no 
evidence that women were coerced. In the end, the hubbub forced Abe to apologize for his 
remarks. He chose to deliver this apology to President George W. Bush rather than to the Korean 
government.59 
Back in power in 2012 after the LDP’s legislative victory, Abe and his government 
quickly returned to making revisionist moves, with the Prime Minister visiting Yasukuni Shrine 
in December 2013 (although, amid scolding from neighbors and allies, he has not visited since, 
sending donations or cabinet members instead), approving revisionist textbooks, and establishing 
committees to reconsider past apologies.  
Most importantly, the Abe administration appears to be receiving its marching orders on 
its current core policy, constitutional revision, from Nippon Kaigi. The current plan to maintain 
both sections of Article 9 while adding the Self-Defense Forces in a third section is a novel 
                                                 
57 McNeill, David, and Adam Lebowitz. "Hammering down the educational nail: Abe revises the Fundamental Law 
of Education." The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 5.7 (2007). 
58Ouchi, Hirokazu. "Kyoiku Kihon-ho ‘kaitei’ to sono go." Nihon no Ukeika Tettei Chо̄sa. Ed.Tsukada Hotaka. 
Tokyo: Chikuma Shobо̄, 2017. Print. 148-167 155. 
59 McGregor, Richard. Asia's Reckoning: China, Japan, and the Fate of U.S. Power in the Pacific Century. NY, NY: 
Viking, 2017. Print. 
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proposal, which appears nowhere until its publication in the Nippon Kaigi-affiliated Japan Policy 
Research Center’s public proposal in 2016. Abe suddenly announced this new direction for 
constitutional revision to a meeting of the Citizens' Association for Creating a Constitution for a 
Beautiful Japan, mentioned above, in 2017 and has set about convincing his party that a shift 
away from the proposed deletion of the clause that renounces military power is a good idea. 
Nippon Kaigi has played a key role in this process, dedicating a meeting of its giin renmei in 
February 2018 to convincing parliamentarians that “deleting [the no-military clause] is a fair 
argument but unrealistic.”60 
The overlap in LDP policy and Nippon Kaigi’s priorities is not absolute, of course. The 
LDP liberal wing still exists, although Koichi Kato’s failed takeover attempt in 2000 and the 
failure of the Fukuda administration has made it smaller than it has ever been; there is spirited 
debate within the party on many issues. Proposals in support of socially liberal policies like civil 
partnerships and local voting rights for foreign permanent residents are raised within the LDP, 
although they are no longer adopted. On foreign policy, as well, the Abe administration has 
frequently shown restraint. The 2015 war anniversary statement, although lukewarm about war 
crimes, was far from the revisionist screed feared, in 2017 no cabinet members visited Yasukuni 
Shrine, and despite being urged by the right-wing media to not attend in response to continued 
South Korean complaints over the comfort women issue, Abe attended the 2018 Winter 
Olympics in PyeongChang, South Korea.  
One might raise the possibility that this apparent influence by Nippon Kaigi on LDP 
policy is really the reverse, a situation in which Nippon Kaigi and other right-wing groups are 
mobilized to support the LDP’s policy decisions. This claim was made to the author by a high-
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ranking official in the LDP.61 There is most likely a give and take on many issues, but the high 
emphasis put by Nippon Kaigi on mustering support within the LDP for conservative causes and 
the perfunctory nature of much of the “grassroots” conservative activism suggests that influence 
on policy is largely exercised by Nippon Kaigi on the LDP. There is a large, ostensibly 
independent, albeit deeply politically connected group of public intellectuals connected to 
Nippon Kaigi publishing ideas in the conservative media constantly, and it seems unlikely they 
are receiving direction on their proposals from politicians. 
Religious Nationalists as an Electoral Base? 
The question left unanswered then, is why does Nippon Kaigi hold influence over the 
LDP, to the extent of encouraging the party to pursue unpopular policy priorities? The most 
obvious explanation would be that the religious groups that provide Nippon Kaigi’s base of 
support provide important electoral support to the LDP. However, a closer analysis reveals this to 
be unlikely to provide a full answer. 
As discussed above, the two major bases of support for Nippon Kaigi are Shintо̄ Shrines 
and a set of new religions. The Association of Shintо̄ Shrines self-reports itself as having 74 
million followers,62 a full 60 percent of the population of Japan. However, this count is based on 
an estimate that includes people who visit shrines at New Year (hatsumо̄de) or buy amulets at 
shrines.63 Most shrinegoers’ participation does not go beyond this and is a far cry from what can 
be considered membership in an organized religion. In reality, shrines have minimal power to 
mobilize large populations, as their involvement in the community goes little beyond performing 
rituals for people during certain life cycle events and providing a public space for festivals, 
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weddings, and the like. In meetings with shrine priests, I confirmed that aside from displaying 
posters and distributing political literature on premises, shrines do not actively participate in 
electioneering.64 The only direct electoral mobilizing power that shrines have is among shrine 
priests and other employees. The number of shrine priests declines yearly, and there are now only 
21,718 shrine priests nationwide, not even enough to staff Japan’s over 80,000 shrines,65 and 
although leadership of the Association of Shintо̄ Shrines is united around conservative causes, 
the large number of shrines that do not participate in the Shrine Association and examples of 
fierce disputes between individual shrines and the Association over leadership and other issues 
show deep divisions even within this small group of people.66 
My source in the LDP raised the idea that chief priests in major shrines are often 
important figures in the community. For instance, the chief priest of Terakuni Shrine in 
Kagoshima is also the head of the Shimazu samurai clan. I still think there is not enough 
evidence to make a claim that shrines have the ability to mobilize large numbers of voters. 
Despite the very visible role of shrines in Nippon Kaigi, it is difficult to say they have much 
effect during campaigns. 
Religious sects, as opposed to Shintо̄ shrines, have a clearer role in election politics. 
These religions usually have regular meetings, clear memberships, defined teachings, and, as 
stated above, a political ideology. They do in fact encourage their members to vote and volunteer 
for LDP candidates in elections. The membership of these religious groups, however, has 
declined consistently since the 1990s, during the same period Nippon Kaigi was formed and 
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gained influence. Reiyukai’s membership, for instance, declined from 3 million in 1994 to 1.3 
million in 2014. Gedatsu-kai fell from 224,000 to just 99,000 in this same time period.67 This 
trend holds for the majority of the religious groups participating in Nippon Kaigi, and those that 
did not decline also did not increase their membership by much. We can test the effect of this 
decline on politics by comparing the number votes received by LDP candidates backed in the 
national block during House of Councillors elections in 1997 with 2013. This comparison is 
particularly pure as these candidates competed with other LDP candidates, backed by different 
groups, for votes based on name recognition and institutional support. The difference is stark. In 
1977, the candidate backed by Seicho-no-Ie and Shintо̄ Seiji Renmei received 1.1 million votes, 
coming in second among LDP candidates, while in 2013, Eto Seichi and Arimura Haruko, both 
backed by Nippon Kaigi new religions and Shintо̄ Seiji Renmei, received only 200,000 votes 
apiece.68 It is unreasonable to think that the LDP would increasingly rely on religious groups 
with precipitously declining memberships to provide an electoral base.  
One might suggest that religious groups provide financial support to the LDP. Major 
shrines like Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines are notably wealthy, receiving large contributions from 
business. Political contributions in Japan are extremely complex and have yet to be significantly 
analyzed at the granular level, but a cursory look at the funding for the primary funding pipeline 
for the LDP, the Kokumin Seiji Kyokai, shows that almost all of the LDP’s 20 billion annual yen 
in donations comes from business.69 Searches for donations from shrines, new religions, and 
even individual priests on the (admittedly limited) Japan Center for Money and Politics database 
found only small donations, with the most noticeable going to Arimura Haruko, an officer of 
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Nippon Kaigi and Shintо̄ Seiji Renmei. According to my source in the LDP almost all funding 
for the party (outside of party dues and public funding) comes from the Japan Business 
Federation and other business interests. 70 Due to the large numbers of contributions to individual 
politicians that are anonymized via fundraising events, contributions by religious groups cannot 
be completely ruled out – but they do not seem to be an important source of income for the LDP. 
Japan’s Religious Nationalist Lobby: The Legislative Subsidy Model 
With the obvious factors of votes and money out, what influences are left? A model that 
seems to fit Nippon Kaigi well Nippon Kaigi was introduced by Richard Hall and Alan 
Deardorff in their 2006 paper “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” In this paper, they propose that 
American lobbyists do not primarily influence politicians by directly buying their votes or by 
persuading them of the correctness of their positions, but by providing “policy information, 
political intelligence and legislative labor” to “natural allies” in the legislature. Legislators have a 
limited amount of these resources which they need to utilize on multiple issues, and lobbyists, as 
specialists, have knowledge that legislators do not and the willingness to focus their time and 
effort on particular issues. In this model, the additional “subsidy” by lobbyists to legislators 
makes it “cheaper” in terms of effort for the legislator to make progress on the issue of concern; 
this reduction in cost encourages the legislator to focus on that issue as opposed to other issues. 
One corollary of this model is that lobbyists will spend more time helping their strongest allies 
and not waste time on legislators who are uncommitted or do not agree with them, as the subsidy 
would not increase the utility of advancing the policy desired. Another suggests that even if 
lobbyists are unable to assist in the legislator’s reelection through money or campaigning, 
politicians will still listen to them.71 
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LDP Diet members are certainly not all “natural allies” of Nippon Kaigi, but Prime 
Minister Abe and his close confidants have been involved in nationalist causes for many years. 
As noted above, his cabinet has a higher membership of nationalist Diet caucuses than the LDP 
at large and includes many officers of these caucuses. It has become almost a cliché to note that 
Prime Minister Abe has a strong desire to fully exonerate his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, from 
the label of war criminal through historical revision, and dreams of fulfilling Kishi’s long-
delayed wish of amending the constitution. Finance Minister, former Prime Minister, and Abe 
number two Aso Taro, scion of a business dynasty that used forced labor during the war, also has 
an incentive to clear the name of his family. As for back-bench parliamentarians, the 2009 
crushing defeat of the LDP ironically handed Abe the opportunity to nominate dozens of new 
right-wing candidates to office in 2012, remaking the party in his image. The LDP is more 
ideologically monochrome than it has ever been. According to leaders at several Nippon Kaigi-
affiliated new religions whom I interviewed,72 many Diet members are active believers in their 
faiths. It is difficult to gauge the validity of this statement, as it is not common for Diet members 
to talk publicly about their religion, but I confirmed through finance records that several Diet 
members paid for memberships in religious organizations like Gedatsu-kai and OISCA with 
campaign funds.  
The service – namely fleshed out policy proposals – that Nippon Kaigi provides to the 
LDP is consistent with the legislative subsidy model and have become more necessary than ever 
for the party. The shift in the LDP most often cited from the change in 1994 from multi-member 
to single member districts is a decline in factionalism, but an additional loss was that of “zoku-
giin,” parliamentarians who have a special interest group, frequently an industry group or 
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government ministry, as their electoral base. These members were usually ex-bureaucrats or 
former industry executives. Their major purpose is to use their specialized knowledge and 
connections with industry to guide the policy making process as members of the LDP’s Policy 
Research Committee, utilizing their ties to work closely with the bureaucracy, rejecting and 
amending proposals when necessary while causing as little conflict as possible. The shift in 
electoral law, however, removed the ability of the LDP to parcel out votes based on particular 
industry constituencies, instead requiring candidates to appeal to all segments of the base, losing 
out on specialized knowledge.73 Additionally, the LDP, ever since the 2001-2006 Koizumi 
administration, which overcame opposition within the party and the bureaucracy and 
implemented neo-liberal reforms, has drastically shifted in its approach to policy making, from 
“bureaucrat-led politics” to “Cabinet led politics.” In practice, this meant a shift away from 
relying on the Policy Research Committee, which received policy suggestions from the 
bureaucracy via zoku-giin, to relying on special committees ruled by the Prime Minister and 
staffed with his close associates, especially when it comes to key policy objectives that are 
unpopular with the bureaucracy like inflationary monetary policy and participation in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership.74 This, however, means a significant loss in assistance from the bureaucracy 
in crafting policy proposals. The loss of policy information and legislative labor on other policies 
combined with increased lobbying by religious nationalists gives the administration an incentive 
to work on issues favored by religious nationalists. 
Aside from these legislative subsidies, religious nationalists also provide services that are 
further from the traditional sphere of lobbyists. The support of Shintо̄ shrines provides a certain 
amount of ‘traditional’ legitimacy for the ruling party. Religious nationalists have also 
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constructed a parallel academic and media sphere to counter the relatively liberal mainstream, 
providing a façade of legitimacy for nationalist policies. For instance, in response to an open 
letter by hundreds of Western Japanese Studies scholars condemning the Japanese government’s 
actions on the comfort women issue, around one hundred scholars (most were honorary or 
former professors not currently working at a university) signed onto a letter written by Nippon 
Kaigi chairman Tadae Takubo condemning it.75  A clear episode demonstrating this utility 
occurred when a reporter asked Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide about a survey showing 
that 90 percent of constitutional law scholars in Japan believe that collective self-defense is 
unconstitutional. To defend the government’s position, Suga cited three scholars who believed 
the reinterpretation to be acceptable. The three scholars, Nagao Kazuhiro, Akira Momochi, and 
Nishi Osamu are all key members of Nippon Kaigi.76 Religious nationalists provide an important 
source of opinion journalism supporting the ruling party’s more extreme nationalist policies, 
providing support when even conservative standard-bearers like the Yomiuri Shimbun refuse to 
do so. Regardless of serious scandals or unpopular policy moves, Sankei Shimbun and right-wing 
opinion magazines like Seiron, Hanada, and WiLL, provide an inexhaustible reserve of partisan 
justifications for politicians. These parallel media and academic spheres may not convince the 
general public, but without them the LDP would have difficulty answering their critics at all, yet 
another example of the services provided by religious nationalists to the ruling party. 
Conclusion 
This thesis has laid out the history and ideology of religious nationalists in Japan and 
analyzed the effect that these nationalists have on the policy decisions of the LDP. Far from 
                                                 
75 “Japanese Scholars’ Reply to the American Scholars’ Comfort Women Statement,” 6 Aug, 2015, http://eng.the-
liberty.com/pdf/20150808_document.pdf. 
76 Tawara 7 
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“secretly running Japan,” these groups work with the LDP in a reciprocal fashion to advance 
common policy aims. These policy aims are deeply concerning to anyone who is concerned 
about the rule of law and the liberal world order, but do not stem from a rising popularity of 
these aims or of the groups that support them in society. The LDP’s present attention to 
nationalist policies is dependent on the power of a particular LDP ideological faction and the 
tacit consent of the United States. Rather than decrying illusory changes in society or secret 
ruling cliques, opponents of these aims would do better to think of concrete ways to change 
Japan’s political system to shift the policy incentives of the people in leadership; or to change 
those leaders. 
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Appendix 1 
Nippon Kaigi Board Members Associated with Religious Groups (as of September 2017) 
 
a: Shintо̄ Shrine/Shintо̄ New Religion b: Buddhist c: Other New Religion 
 
Advisors 
Name Title 
Kitashirakawa Michihisa   Association of Shintо̄ Shrines (General 
Manager) a 
Komatsu Kiyohisa Ise Shrine Grand Priest a 
Vice Chairman 
Tanaka Tsunekiyo Association of Shintо̄ Shrines (President) a 
Representative Committee Member 
Akimoto Kyotoku Shinsei Bukkyodan Supreme Advisor b 
Inayama Reiho Nenpou Shinkyou Chief Priest b 
Uchida Fumihiro Shintо̄ Seiji Renmei President a 
Okada Ko’ou Sukyo Mahikari Oshienushi c 
Okano Seiho Gedatsu Church President b 
Ogushi Kazuo Atsuta Shrine Chief Priest a 
Ono Takashi Tokyo Association of Shintо̄ Shrines Head a 
Ohori Kojitsu Hieizan Enryakuji Representative Officer b 
Sekiguchi Yoshikazu Bussho-Gonenkai President b 
Takagi Harunobu Ise Shrine Assistant Grand Priest a 
Tokugawa Yasuhisa Yasukuni Shrine Head Priest a 
Nakajima Seitarou Meiji Shrine Head Priest a 
Nakano Yoshiko OISCA International (Ananaikyo) President a 
Hiroike Mototaka Moralogy Research Institute Board Chairman 
(Reitaku University) a 
Hozumi Hidetane Taiwa-Kyodan Kyonushi a 
Maruyama Toshiaki RINRI Institute of Ethics Chairman [PL 
Kyodan] c 
Board Chairman 
Amitani Michihiko Meiji Shrine Worshippers’ Association 
President a 
 
Source: http://www.nipponkaigi.org/about/yakuin (Nippon Kaigi Officer List) 
Other Religious Groups Associated with Nippon Kaigi (past officers, etc.) 
Reiyukai Tendai Buddhist Nichiren Buddhist 
(Nichirenshu) 
Kurozumikyo   
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Figure 1: Japanese Attitudes Toward East Asian Neighbors77 
 
 
                                                 
77 Public Relations Office, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. “Overview of the Public Opinion Survey on 
Diplomacy” December 2017. https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h29/h29-gaiko/summary.pdf 
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